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Prescription  drugs  are  the  highest  single  cost  component  for employees’  beneﬁts  packages
in Canada.  While  industry  literature  considers  cost-containment  for  prescription  drug  costs
to  be a  priority  for  insurers  and  employers,  the implementation  of  cost-containment  meas-
ures for  private  drug  plans  in  Canada  remains  more  of  a myth  than  a reality.  Through  18
semi-structured  phone  interviews  conducted  with  experts  from  private  sector  companies,
unions,  insurers  and  plan  advisors,  this  study  explores  the reasons  behind  this incapac-
ity  to implement  cost-containment  measures  by  examining  how  private  sector  employers
negotiate  drug  beneﬁt  design  in unionized  settings.  Respondents  were  asked  questions  on
how  employee  beneﬁts  are  negotiated;  the  relationships  between  the  players  who  inﬂu-
ence drug  beneﬁt  design;  the  role  of these  players’  strategies  in  inﬂuencing  plan  design;  the
broad system  that underpins  drug  beneﬁt  design;  and the  potential  for  a universal  pharma-Health insurance care  program  in Canada.  The  study  shows  that  there  is  consensus  about  the  need  to  educate
employees  and  employers,  more  collaboration  and  data-sharing  between  these  two  sets
of players,  and  for external  intervention  from  government  to  help  transform  established
norms  in  terms  of private  drug  plan  design.
© 2014  The  Authors.  Published  by Elsevier  Ireland  Ltd.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under
the  CC  BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).1. Introduction
Canada’s universal healthcare system does not cover
prescription drugs. Public drug coverage is mostly provided
on a provincial basis to seniors and people on social assis-
tance. Many provinces also offer public catastrophic drug
coverage for the rest of the population (e.g. for patients
∗ Corresponding author at: School of Public Policy and Administration,
Carleton University (RB 5224), 1125 Colonel By Drive, Ottawa, Ontario,
Canada K1S 5B6. Tel.: +1 613 520 2600.
E-mail address: ma.gagnon@carleton.ca (M.-A. Gagnon).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2014.11.013
0168-8510/© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ireland Ltd. This is an open
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).receiving public subsidies once they contribute more than
3–4% of their annual income toward prescription drugs)
[1]. Most Canadians are covered through private drug
plans offered mostly by employers through supplemental
health beneﬁts: 51% of Canadian workers have supple-
mental medical beneﬁts [2], and since work-related health
insurance also covers dependents of employees with cov-
erage, as many as two-thirds of Canadians are covered by
health insurance plans.Prescription drug spending in Canada’s private sector
has increased nearly ﬁvefold in 20 years, from $3.6 billion
in 1993 to $15.9 billion in 2013 [3]. Private drug plans in
Canada are often considered wasteful because they accept
 access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
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aying for higher priced drugs that do not improve health
utcomes for users and use costly sub-optimal dispensing
ntervals for maintenance medications. As a consequence, it
s estimated that private drug plans in Canada wasted $5.1
illion in 2012, which is money spent without receiving
herapeutic beneﬁts in return [4]. This amount represented
2% of the total expenditures of $9.8 billion by private
nsurers on prescription drugs for that year [5].
Canadian employers have demonstrated growing con-
ern for cost-containment in the design of their employees’
rug beneﬁts. However, the implementation of cost-
ontainment measures for private drug plans remains more
f a myth than a reality [6–10] since few plans require caps
or dispensing fees, premiums from claimants, mandatory
eneric substitution or restrictions on more expensive but
ot therapeutically superior new drugs [9]. The Canadian
ife and Health Insurance Association, concerned about
he sustainability of private drug coverage in Canada, has
sked for government help to reduce costs [11]. Growing
dministrative costs of private health plans continues to
ut additional ﬁnancial pressures on the capacity to offer
rivate health beneﬁts [12].
A lack of published literature on how drug beneﬁts are
egotiated and implemented required us to explore the
ubject in interviews with employers, union representa-
ives, insurers and consultants working for employers or
nions. We  focused on unionized workplaces. In 2013,
pproximately 13.3% of all workers in Canada were
nionized private sector employees, 18% were unionized
ublic sector employees, and the rest being non-unionized
mployees [13]. By focusing on drug beneﬁts in unionized
ettings, we were able to beneﬁt from the insights of union
epresentatives who have signiﬁcant expertise in supple-
ental health beneﬁts. Drug beneﬁts in unionized settings
re often considered similar to those of non-unionized
rganizations [14].
. Methodology
We  identiﬁed key informants working within the most
rominent Canadian organizations in the four organiza-
ional categories examined in this study, who provided us
ith leads to create a cohort of potential interview par-
icipants. After initial contact with these key informants,
 non-probability sampling technique known as snowball
ampling [15] was employed to reach further respondents
hat had key exposure to the drug beneﬁt design process
nd could provide insights that could be generalized, to
ome extent, across their organizational categories. We
xtended an invitation to over 60 representatives from 14
nions, 9 private sector employers, 19 insurance compa-
ies, and 17 beneﬁts consultancies to participate in the
esearch project. Among those invited, 18 experts agreed
o participate in the interview process, four of whom were
rom private ﬁrms, ﬁve from unions, ﬁve from beneﬁts
onsultancies, and four represented insurance companies.
e  carried out one-to-one semi-structured interviewsetween September 2012 and January of 2013.
The study focused on large unionized workplaces that
ad Administrative Services Only (ASO) plans, where the
mployer is responsible for the costs of beneﬁt plans and 119 (2015) 224–231 225
bears the risks associated with it, while insurers are just
hired to manage claims. This study focused on ASO arrange-
ments because they are the most common insurance option
chosen by large private-sector ﬁrms [16]. Those organi-
zations whose activities resided solely in the province of
Québec, where the regulation of private drug plans differs
[17], were excluded.
Participants were asked to participate in semi-
structured phone interviews lasting 20–30 min. With a
speciﬁc emphasis on drug beneﬁts, questions focused on
four main themes: how employee beneﬁts are negotiated;
the relationships between the players who  inﬂuence drug
beneﬁt design; the role of these players’ strategies in inﬂu-
encing plan design; and the broad system that underpins
drug beneﬁt design. With respect to this last theme, the
respondents were asked to describe the inequities inher-
ent in the system and their recommendations for reform,
including their opinion about a national public drug plan
in Canada. One insurer was  unable to respond to questions
pertaining to the last theme because the time allotted in
this respondent’s schedule prevented the interview from
reaching these questions.
The research design was reviewed and approved by
the Carleton University Research Ethics Board. Since the
nature of the topic discussed was sensitive for some of
the organizations involved, the agreed protocol guaranteed
all participants anonymity by not disclosing the names of
the participants and their afﬁliated institutions. Any details
which would enable readers to identify the participants
or the organizations were deliberately excluded from this
paper.
We carried out a standard thematic analysis by tran-
scribing and analyzing the contents of the audio ﬁles. Based
on the results of the interviews, we developed a narrative
encompassing four new themes which differ from the ini-
tial themes under which the questions were organized. The
contents were then ascribed initial codes and organized
into themes and sub-themes based on the transcriptions’
contents. The authors relied on their judgment to iden-
tify themes from the interview data, as no quantitative
standard measuring the prevalence of subject content can
adequately capture the depth of such qualitative data [18].
Thus, our strategy to analyze these data involved coding the
data into a conceptual framework from which the research
results are drawn [19].
3. Research ﬁndings
The following four sections describe the core ﬁndings
through four themes: objectives; tactics and strategies;
barriers to change; and recommendations for reform.
3.1. Objectives vis-à-vis drug beneﬁt design
Drug beneﬁt design decisions are arrived at through
professional networks of employers, unions, insurers, and
beneﬁts consultants. The interviews showed that these sets
of players have different interpretations of what is at stake
in drug beneﬁt outcomes, their intentions in inﬂuencing
these outcomes, as well as their perceptions of the other’s
intentions. Table 1 categorizes these player’s intentions in
226 S. O’Brady et al. / Health Policy 119 (2015) 224–231
Table 1
Monetary and non-monetary objectives identiﬁed by participants.
Objectives Employers Unions Insurers Consultants
Monetary - Cost-savings. - Generous beneﬁts. - Contracts. - Employers purchasing services.
Non-monetary - Consistency of beneﬁt
provision with other players in
the market.
- Membership approval.
- Demonstrating gains and
thereby their utility to
- A more direct relationship
with their clients (cutting out
the consultants).
- Maintain their usefulness.- Talent attraction and
retention.
- Control.
employees.
accordance with their stated monetary and non-monetary
objectives.
Both employers and other actors in this study cited
cost-savings as being important. Typically, the employ-
ers indicated that monetary items in collective bargaining
are discussed on a cost-neutral basis; meaning that an
increase in a beneﬁt line item must be offset by cost-savings
elsewhere. Thus, changes in beneﬁts are discussed in the
context of introducing changes to compensation, as any
cost increase or saving in one area affects the entire bas-
ket of goods offered to employees in their compensation
packages.
Respondents from all categories indicated that con-
sistency of beneﬁts with other market players is of
signiﬁcance to employers. Three employers explicitly
expressed a desire to offer beneﬁt packages that are at least
on par with their competitors. Firms constantly realign
their beneﬁt packages to meet the industry standard since
employee beneﬁts are used as a tool for the attraction and
retention of talent. One employer described this need in the
following words: “The whole package of both mandated and
discretionary beneﬁts have to be within a range that allows
us to compete in the marketplace. So if, for example, we were
to look at our beneﬁt costs and ﬁnd out that no one in the
market place provided prescription drug coverage, we would
have to assess that and try to make changes in the collective
agreements so as to either eliminate that or modify the beneﬁt
to make it more cost effective.”
Respondents from all categories mentioned that, in con-
trast to employers, the over-riding objective of unions is
to maximize their beneﬁts with minimal co-payments for
their employees. In the words of one respondent on the
union side, “we as a union want as much as possible. We  try
to keep whatever we have or improve upon it.” This point
was made by a union member who claimed that “the union
side is far more democratic and more intense because you
have to deal with the membership, as well as just the leader-
ship.” As unions function according to democratic models,
their leadership is highly responsive to (and inﬂuenced by)
attitudes of members relating to beneﬁts and collective
agreements. This governance model presents some difﬁ-
culties for achieving optimal plan designs because even
well-informed union leaders who want to implement cost-
containment measures may  be hamstrung by the demands
of their members. Thus, effective plan design changes need
signiﬁcant employee engagement so that the members will
ultimately buy-in to the proposed changes.On the other hand, consultancies and insurers indicated
that they are primarily interested in keeping their busi-
nesses aﬂoat and contracting out their services though they
have different motivations. The consultancies mostly wantto preserve their relationships with plan sponsors, while
the insurers want to play a more consultative role with
their clients, and reduce the inﬂuence of beneﬁts consul-
tancies.
3.2. Tactics and strategies
The respondents varied in their interpretations of the
use of strategies in the negotiating process. All of the actors
reported using some sort of strategy to achieve objectives;
however, the use of strategies and tactics by employers and
unions was most prevalent.
The employers indicated that their over-riding strategy
is to maintain cost-neutrality in providing drug beneﬁts –
in the context of overall compensation – to employees: any
increases in the costs of a particular beneﬁts area must be
off-set by cost-savings elsewhere. Controlling knowledge
was  also frequently reported by the union-side respon-
dents (and by one consultant that services employers) as
a strategy to achieve greater control over negotiations and
plan design by ﬁrms. According to one union representa-
tive, “the employer always has the advantage in this stuff
because they have all of the information with respect to the
reports and the costs from the insurer or the advisor” and in
one circumstance the union “almost had to threaten them
(the employer) with legal action in order to get some basic
information out of them around costing.” Thus, employers
are perceived by unions as employing this tactic to pre-
vent union negotiators from challenging their positions
and proposals. Under this scenario, unions cannot opti-
mally contribute constructive analyses and proposals since
they do not have sufﬁcient access to data. This practice was
identiﬁed as being particularly problematic, for it prevents
unions and employees from being sufﬁciently educated to
contribute to plan design discussions in a meaningful man-
ner.
One employer argued that even when information is
shared, there is a lack of trust which prevents the two
parties from moving forward in terms of plan design. While
this employer argued that they frequently consult unions
on speciﬁc plan changes and “feel that they (the union)
would beneﬁt by having better support around these issues,”
they also admitted to not sharing information or consul-
ting the union when it is not required under the collective
agreement. The employer “had no obligation to ask for the
consent of the union and the company” for speciﬁc plan
design changes and were “able to make changes” with-
out any sort of dialog. This caused a breakdown of trust
between the two  parties and hindered their capacity to
educate the union on plan changes, since the union is only
consulted after the fact.
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In the views of one employer, an important strategy
sed by unions negotiating with numerous employers
ithin a sector has been to play employers against
ne another. Therefore, when one employer accedes to
emands, its competitor feels pressured to make similar
oncessions to ensure that it retains a talented and moti-
ated workforce. One employer indicated that this strategy
an put less ﬁnancially viable ﬁrms at risk, since wealth-
er companies may  willingly make concessions that their
ompetitors cannot afford.
However, another employer indicated that companies
ay  collaborate when their employees are represented
y the same union and cooperation is in their shared
nterest. Coordination among multiple employers can lead
o the adoption of consistent proposals between ﬁrms.
f achieved, this harmonization makes it challenging for
nions to play employers against each other and it can
elp employers to negotiate declines in beneﬁts at an
ndustry level for speciﬁc occupation groups. This type of
oordination eases ﬁrm speciﬁc fears over losing talent to
ompetitors.
Insurers play a smaller role in the negotiating process.
ne strategy mentioned by all insurers was adding value
o services. Or as one insurer puts it, “we really don’t have
 strategy, aside from providing value and getting clients to
ee that value.” One example was introducing cutting-edge
nformation technology to streamline claims adjudication.
ne insurer highlighted the transition from paper to elec-
ronic claims submissions processes to cut costs and reduce
he burden of submitting physical claims as an example
f value-added services to differentiate themselves from
heir competitors. Most of the respondents indicated that
nsurance companies are not particularly concerned with
trategies and beneﬁt outcomes, focusing instead on the
dministration of claims and execution of plan designs
emanded by their clients (i.e. employers). This was evi-
ent by the fact that most respondents who spoke on this
uestion (including the insurers themselves) indicated that
nsurance companies are indifferent as to whether cost-
ontainment measures are included in beneﬁt plans. Thus,
nsurers were reported as having no incentives for reducing
he costs of plans.
On the other hand, employers use strategies in their
ealings with insurers. With assistance from their beneﬁts
onsultants, employers have the option of going to mar-
et, and look for competing insurers who might offer lower
dministrative costs, or otherwise pressure their current
arrier to lower their price. Plan advisors have experience
n dealing with multiple insurers simultaneously. Many
mployers see value in plan advisors. With a deeper knowl-
dge of claims management and a range of methods to
ut costs, plan advisors can help pool employers together,
rovide expert advice on costing, assist employers in going
o market, and carry out expert negotiations on behalf of
lients.
.3. Barriers to changeSome clear barriers to change were identiﬁed. A major-
ty of respondents indicated that poor information-sharing
as a barrier to achieving cost-effective plan outcomes. 119 (2015) 224–231 227
One beneﬁts consultant indicated that this is symptomatic
of the “old model”  where communication over beneﬁt
design is limited to a few key players. Typically, lim-
ited communication between unions and employers’ plan
advisors and insurers results in a loss for unions. Some
workers’ bargaining units might have access to internal
expertise from their union; but this is more of an excep-
tion.
According to one consultant, “no one knows the cost of
drug beneﬁt plans.” This respondent was arguing that few
involved in beneﬁt design, either in private ﬁrms, unions,
or insurers, are sufﬁciently competent to undertake proper
analyses of claims data so they do not really know how pro-
posed plan changes could affect them. This lack of expertise
has ramiﬁcations for the education of stakeholders on the
outcomes of beneﬁt design.
We also found that a lack of trust was perceived as a fac-
tor inhibiting progress in beneﬁt design, the breakdown of
which is blamed on historical precedents between unions
and their employers.
A lack of employee engagement by the private sector
was also considered to be a problem. Respondents from
all sides frequently indicated that employees often wanted
more comprehensive beneﬁts, despite the fact that they
achieve smaller pay raises if they are paying for inefﬁcient
beneﬁts packages, rather than using more efﬁcient drug
beneﬁt design to redistribute the savings to wages or other
beneﬁts. Employees may become resistant and distrustful
when changes are introduced without sufﬁciently inform-
ing them on how those beneﬁts will affect them and their
families.
The democratic structure of union governance was
identiﬁed as a barrier to change by respondents on
the union and consultancy sides. Without information-
sharing and employee engagement, especially education
of employees on aspects of their beneﬁts, union leaders
cannot adopt a progressive approach to drug beneﬁts nego-
tiations. One insurer referred to a conversation he had
with a union leader on the beneﬁts of introducing cost-
containment measures into plan design. In this purported
conversation, the union leader expressed that his sup-
port for an initiative is meaningless unless the union’s
membership has an appetite for a more cost effective
plan design. Furthermore, some union, employer, and con-
sultant respondents claimed that when the union lacks
expertise or capacity, they are working blindfolded, with-
out the knowledge and expertise needed to negotiate
better beneﬁt packages.
Various union respondents also recognized that many
Canadian unions have this capacity for generating
knowledge and expertise through the use of in-house com-
pensation specialists and/or union oriented consultants.
For example, one of the interviewed unions has a research
team that would “parachute in”  to assist the local for part
of the negotiating process and “in a couple of sets of negoti-
ations, the research department will be in there from start to
ﬁnish.” Having the needed knowledge and expertise when
and where you need them can translate into innovative
plan designs, so long as the insights generated from this
are effectively passed on to union locals at the bargaining
table. One union representative said that lack of trust and
th Policy228 S. O’Brady et al. / Heal
information asymmetries are less of an issue when the
union is the plan sponsor.
How the insurance industry is organized and operates
was also reported as being detrimental to beneﬁt design
outcomes. Some interviewees said that the biggest prob-
lem is that insurers do not have an incentive to introduce
cost-effectiveness clauses in plan design. For instance, one
beneﬁts consultant stated that most companies “in Canada
will buy whatever formulary their insurance company offers”
and that “well over 90% of group insurance plans in Canada
consist of every single drug available for sale with a notice of
compliance issued from Health Canada.”
While there are instances in which these companies
consult their clients on plan options, most of the insur-
ers saw themselves as reactive (and receptive) to client
demands, rather than as the initiator in introducing cost-
effective changes to plan design. Private-for-proﬁt insurers
were described as administrators of plan design who  dif-
fer in some respects from their not-for-proﬁt counterparts.
As one of the insurer puts it, a not-for-proﬁt insurer “will
always look to reduce costs” and “additional claims”  for their
groups, while “a for-proﬁt insurer may  want the additional
claims because they get paid per claim”.
However, when speaking of for-proﬁt insurers, partici-
pants from all groups argued that insurers have no ﬁnancial
incentives to cut costs for employers, as indicated by one
employer saying: “from my experience on the committees, I
don’t get the impression that the insurers are there to save
costs for the employers. I haven’t seen it. It’s always been
the other direction.” This claim was also corroborated by
a beneﬁts consultant, who argued that “there has been a
fair bit of inertia, you know, amongst the providers out there
in actually doing something too radical, too leading edge”
because “there’s no direct ﬁnancial incentive for insurance
companies or pharmacy beneﬁt managers to actually help
employers save money”.  Expanding on this, another consult-
ant argued that an insurer’s commission structure, which
is based on volumes of claims expressed in a dollar value,
may  in fact discourage insurance companies from propos-
ing plan designs that reduce the volumes of claims, as doing
so would adversely affect company proﬁts. Furthermore,
another beneﬁts consultant indicated that insurers are
experts who calculate risk and thereby have no aptitude for
the creation of formularies. According to this respondent,
the impact is that insurance companies excel at managing
risk, yet fare poorly in designing cost-effective plans that
rely on the design and implementation of formularies.
3.4. Recommendations for reform
Greater openness and trust, in terms of information-
sharing was suggested by an overwhelming majority of
respondents from each category. Similarly, one insurer
expressed immense support for having an “intelligent con-
versation” with all the relevant insurers, companies and
unions at the national level on the potential for more sus-
tainable plan outcomes. This comment was made with
regard to a lack of information-sharing, as well as an
overall lack of education in terms of the relevant players’
understanding of drug beneﬁt design. Each of the insur-
ers that provided recommendations for reform (3 out of 4) 119 (2015) 224–231
envisioned a form of stakeholder engagement in which the
government would play a role. In the words of one insurer,
“when I say stakeholders, we need federal and provincial gov-
ernments there. We  need doctors there. We need hospitals
there. Pharmacists there. We  need the drug companies there.
The employers, the unions, and the insurance industry.” Next,
this insurer argued that “all of those parties need to come
together cooperatively, put their self-interest aside, put their
egos aside, and ﬁgure out a way to most effectively manage the
exploding cost of beneﬁts, whether they are publicly funded
beneﬁts or privately funded beneﬁts.” This assertion was cor-
roborated by one consultant and one union representative.
However, one employer argued that there have been prece-
dents where the government has regulated pharmaceuti-
cals, with speciﬁc mention of generics, without adequately
consulting industry. Furthermore, another employer rec-
ommended that unions and management acknowledge the
merits of mutual gains and bargain for fostering greater
cooperation and information-sharing between manage-
ment and labor. Mutual gains bargaining presumes that
positive-sum scenarios are plausible, and can be achieved
through principled negotiations that separate the negotia-
tors from the problem and focus on providing gains to both
sides vested in the negotiation’s outcome [20].
There was also signiﬁcant support for providing uni-
versal catastrophic drug coverage, universal drug coverage
for seniors, or universal drug coverage for all Canadians.
An interesting ﬁnding from the interview data was that
respondents from all interviewed groups declared being
in favor of introducing some sort of arrangement for a
national drug plan. Some favored having a universal phar-
macare program which would apply to all drugs, while
others favored programs tailored for catastrophic drug cov-
erage. Two of the insurers that responded to this question
explicitly favored some form of universal catastrophic drug
coverage while the other favored universal pharmacare.
The beneﬁts of such universal pharmacare, argued
one insurer, is that it provides “the employers with some
breathing room”; makes drug coverage and usage more
transparent, which would result in better education on
which drugs are being consumed and how; and provides
opportunities for integrating public and private systems to
facilitate the efﬁcient delivery of drugs to Canadians. Each
of the union representatives and one employer interviewed
for this study expressed their support for universal phar-
macare. Three out of ﬁve consultants argued in favor of
a national pharmacare plan while the other two  favored
some other form of national risk pooling or formulary man-
agement to address costs.
While a majority of interviewees favored some form
of universal coverage, a few respondents from the insurer
and employer sides expressed concerns that universal
pharmacare is not feasible. These respondents indicated
that exorbitant costs would be associated with this sort of
program, and that these costs would exceed the projections
of its proponents. Furthermore, one consultant and one
insurer suggested that a national formulary be introduced
as a baseline for beneﬁts providers across the country.
Rather than open formularies, which are the most com-
mon  tool used to manage private drug beneﬁts in Canada,
the suggested formulary would vet drugs according to
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easures of effectiveness, safety and cost-effectiveness.
ne beneﬁts consultant suggested that some sort of
ational pooling and/or purchasing arrangement be intro-
uced to control drug costs for employees. Interestingly,
ational pooling of high drug costs (individual claims
ver $25,000) has been implemented among 23 insurance
ompanies since January 1, 2013. Such pooling, however,
overs fully insured plans only, and exclude ASO plans,
he typical plan structure for larger enterprises analyzed
n this paper [21].
Finally, employers were most concerned with the gov-
rnment’s role in distributing the costs associated with
rug coverage among public and private players in the
ystem. In fact, each employer expressed concern over
his. Three of the four employers expressed concern over
he government’s role as a plan sponsor and how govern-
ents shift costs to the private sector. As described by
ne employer, “the government is a very big consumer of
rugs” and if the drug companies “start losing money on the
overnment side, they pass it on to private insurance”. Thus,
overnment regulations that help employers contain costs
re desired.
. Discussion
Our analysis identiﬁed key issues at stake when it comes
o creating and negotiating private drug coverage. The com-
unity of experts who participated in this project appeared
o have a common understanding of what constitutes the
alient issues facing the drug beneﬁts in the Canadian sys-
em. The ﬁve following points were most striking in our
nalysis.
.1. The necessity of information-sharing
This study’s major ﬁnding is that a lack of information
nd poor education about drug beneﬁt plan design lead to
oorer outcomes. A lack of cooperation between unions
nd employers has resulted in the creation of silos which
onstrain the lines of communication and the cooperative
se of expertise and information-sharing to improving plan
utcomes for employees.
.2. Democratic governance of unions requires
ngagement of informed employees
A common theme is that a fundamental lack of
mployee engagement has made it difﬁcult for ﬁrms and
nions to achieve the employee buy-in needed to move
oward more rational, cost-effective drug beneﬁt plans.
mployees tend to treasure their beneﬁt packages – even
hen it is against their own best interest – and will call
n their unions to resist changes that diminish cover-
ge. This occurs even when practical plan changes which
ight restrict access to higher cost drugs that are no bet-
er than lower cost alternatives are introduced. The idea
hat drug plans should pay for all drugs on the market
and drugs prescribed by doctors) is very strong. Such an
xpensive mindset poses a disservice to employees who
re often forced to endure cuts to other beneﬁts, wages, 119 (2015) 224–231 229
and even jobs. These are the consequences of having pay-
for-anything drug beneﬁts.
Our ﬁndings lead us to believe that Canada’s private
sector unions have not done enough to engage their mem-
bers. Rather than creating campaigns to educate employees
about progressive changes in their beneﬁts, union lead-
ers, by their need to appease those who  elect them to
leadership positions, continue to placate their members’
desire for generous beneﬁts by resisting change. For the
most part, the union representatives interviewed for this
study were highly aware of the problems facing plan
design and supportive of introducing changes. However,
an analysis of the aggregate responses suggests that this
awareness by experts in prominent Canadian unions still
needs to be transformed into a proactive education cam-
paign on drug beneﬁts in order to attain cost-efﬁcient
outcomes.
4.3. The need for incentives for insurance companies to
reduce costs
Canada’s insurance companies, particularly private
insurers, were not seen as particularly proactive in terms of
introducing plan changes. While some of the respondents
indicated that some insurers were starting to take on a role
in educating plan sponsors about different beneﬁt designs,
insurers were largely perceived as being demand-driven.
That is, their role has been restricted to administering ben-
eﬁt plans with a focus on reducing administrative costs
and introducing innovative technology for claims manage-
ment. Some insurance companies might try to implement
efﬁcient cost-containment measures [22], but for the most
part are not ﬁnancially incented to work in that direction.
As shown above, for-proﬁt insurers actually face the oppo-
site incentives, driving up the costs of claims is conducive to
greater proﬁts for this critical player in beneﬁt design. The
major point here is that there could be a role for policy-
makers to create a more rational incentive structure that
motivates insurers to contain costs for drug coverage, for
example through the principles of managed competition
[23].
4.4. The need for government intervention
It appears that the problems facing beneﬁt provision in
Canada will not resolve themselves without some sort of
government intervention. All players appeared to be aware
of major problems and constraints facing private beneﬁts in
Canada. The momentum is not there yet, in contrast to the
United States, where focusing on cost-effective formulary
management is an essential part of private insurers’ offer-
ings. To resolve this situation, all have suggested some form
of government intervention, either through a national for-
mulary, a risk-pooling scheme, an arrangement designed
to provide some sort of universal pharmacare to Canadians,
or even a broad discussion amongst all the players with a
vested interest in plan outcomes. None of the respondents
indicated that the government ought to play no role in the
future of beneﬁt design. This suggests that there is a strong
need for standardization or regulation which would be tol-
erated by those with a vested interest in plan outcomes,
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but welcomed as beneﬁcial by practitioners in the ﬁeld, so
long as they play a role in the formulation of government
policy.
4.5. Disseminating the shared understanding of problems
and solutions relating to drug beneﬁt design
Interestingly, there appears to be considerable consen-
sus on the nature of the problem and potential solutions.
None of the participants in this study disputed the fact
that most private sector ﬁrms in Canada are not manag-
ing formularies based on cost-effectiveness so the plans
in place provide little emphasis on value-for-money. In
line with this ﬁnding, none of the respondents disputed
that employees are ultimately the loser when ﬁrms pay for
over-generous drug beneﬁt designs that eat up funds that
could be shifted to other forms of compensation (i.e. wages
and other beneﬁts). Their common viewpoint was that the
main players involved in crafting drug beneﬁt plans for
the majority of Canada’s private sector employees are very
aware of the barriers to achieving superior plan outcomes,
but they feel that overall context in which these beneﬁts are
designed is wrought with constraints that leave them feel-
ing powerless to instill progressive change. The problems
are widely recognized, but this consensus among players
must be recognized by policymakers in order to arrive at
a political solution, without which the core problems fac-
ing these organizations are not likely to disappear in the
short-term.
4.6. Limitations
This exploratory study has its limitations. First, in order
to encourage participation in this study, the research design
provided the interviewees with full control over what feed-
back they could provide, and ensured that they were aware
that doing so is voluntary. This constrained our ability to
probe the participants for answers on the most controver-
sial aspects of the study, such as those pertaining to the
use of strategies in the negotiating process. Furthermore,
the fact that many aspects of this topic are controversial or
deal in proprietary business information limits the partic-
ipants’ ability to disclose sensitive information that could
have been quite informative for this study. Participants may
have shifted the interview discussions toward the more
superﬁcial elements to prevent themselves from disclos-
ing industry secrets pertaining to collective bargaining and
plan design. In fact, some consultants refused to partici-
pate in this study because they did not want to disclose
their ﬁrm’s strategies.
In addition, this qualitative study is subject to selection
bias, a common problem in qualitative research, where
we are reﬂecting only the points of view of a select group
of interviewees, thus limiting the generalizability to the
wider population [24]. Thus, the claims made in this paper,
such as that concerning actors’ consensus on the issue
of cost-containment, might be of limited generalizability
in how they reﬂect the views of all insurers, unions,
employers, and consultancies, even if cross-referenced
responses remained consistent among the actors inter-
viewed. Finally, the guarantee of the research participants’ 119 (2015) 224–231
anonymity prevents us from exploring what types of union
structures, relationships with management, and delivery
options (e.g. through unions vs. management or proﬁt vs.
non-proﬁt insurance providers) facilitate the adoption of
more cost-effective plan options. Having greater freedom
to explore the inﬂuence of these variables on plan design
outcomes would provide for a richer analysis on the topic.
5. Conclusion
This paper explored how private sector negotiations
between unions, employers, consultants and insurance
companies fail to achieve drug plan designs that are both
sustainable and cost-effective, and explores potential solu-
tions to the problem. Since pharmaceuticals are the highest
single cost component of private health beneﬁts, there is
an urgent need to implement measures for managing the
costs of drug plans without degrading health outcomes.
Our study shows that there is consensus about the need
to educate employees and employers, more collaboration
and data-sharing between these two sets of players, and
for external intervention from government to help trans-
form established norms in terms of private drug plan
design.
Up to now, in spite of repeated concerns, employers
and insurers have demonstrated little effort to imple-
ment cost-containment measures in private drug plans.
This is in stark contrast to aggressively managed public
plans which limit formularies in order to contain costs
and ensure coverage to those drug products deemed effec-
tive, safe and cost-effective [11,25]. Therefore, it behooves
private plans to emulate public approaches and strate-
gies.
Currently, private drug plans for union members shield
employees from many additional costs, but also shield
them from making rational choices on drug coverage which
are based on considerations of effectiveness, safety and
value for money. This study has pointed out where those
gaps are, especially in knowledge, capacity and data, and
it is now incumbent upon unions, employers, insurers, and
consultants to be proactive in organizing drug beneﬁts in a
sustainable way.
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